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TOP TEN REASONS TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PRIVACY 
JORDAN M. BLANKE* 
ABSTRACT 
Much has been written about the demise of privacy. There is no doubt that 
the notion of privacy has changed dramatically and continues to evolve. 
All, however, is not doom and gloom. While technology and societal 
changes have radically altered the environment in which privacy must sur-
vive, the same basic human needs and values continue to transform it into 
a new shape. Some of the momentum comes from the law itself, some from 
the business world, some from societal values, and some from new empha-
ses in research. This paper will discuss the top ten reasons to be optimistic 
about the future of privacy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It seems like we have been hearing about the death of privacy for a long time. 
From Scott McNealy’s proclamation in 1999 that “[y]ou have zero privacy anyway. 
. . . Get over it”1 to Mark Zuckerberg’s declaration in 2010 that privacy is no longer 
                                                          
 * Ernest L. Baskin, Jr. Distinguished Professor of Computer Science and Law at the Stetson 
School of Business and Economics at Mercer University in Atlanta. 
     1. Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: “Get Over It,” WIRED (Jan. 26, 1999, 12:00 PM), http://ar-
chive.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538. 
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a social norm;2 from privacy legislation’s relegation to the back burner after 9/11;3 
to the utter failure of the notice and consent model on the Web.4 While there is no 
doubt that privacy is very different than it was a generation or two ago, all is not 
doom and gloom. There are some glimmers of hope. 
Obviously, the notion of privacy has evolved tremendously in the past several 
decades. As society changes – often driven by new technology – the law evolves. It 
must. As Professor Neil Richards argued in his classic article Four Privacy Myths, 
privacy is not dead and young people do care about their privacy.5 While the tech-
nocentric world that young people have grown up in certainly differs from the world 
of just a few years ago, they are likely far more savvy about how to navigate that 
world and how to protect their privacy.6 
In this article, I have compiled a list of ten reasons to be optimistic about the 
future of privacy. I have tried to put them in an order of increasing importance, but 
there no doubt, will be room for differing opinions regarding that order. One of the 
things that I tried to do is weigh both the significance of the item as well as the 
likelihood of it happening. For example, if the Katz test were to be completely over-
hauled by the Supreme Court, making it the one-prong objective test it should have 
been for the past fifty years, it would be tremendously important.7 However, the 
likelihood of that happening is very small. Here are the top ten reasons to be opti-
mistic about the future of privacy: 
10. CRIMINAL PRIVACY LAWS ARE FINALLY BEING USED MORE 
Despite the fact that there have been criminal sanctions for various forms of 
computer misuse and invasion of privacy for decades, there has been relatively little 
use of those statutes.8 It appears that this is beginning to change. 
                                                          
 2. Marshall Kilpatrick, Facebook’s Zuckerberg Says the Age of Privacy is Over, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
10, 2010), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/external/reawriteweb/2010/01/10/10r 
eadwriteweb-facebooks-zuckerberg-says-the-age-of-privac-82963.html.  
 3. Daniel Klau, Privacy, Security, and the Legacy of 9/11, UCONN TODAY (Sept. 10, 2015), 
https://today.uconn.edu/2015/09/privacy-security-and-the-legacy-of-911/; Jason Noble, U.S. Debates Se-
curity vs. Privacy 12 Years After 9/11, USA TODAY (Sept. 10, 2013, 11:11 PM), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/10/us-debates-security-vs-privacy-12-years-after-911/2796399/.  
 4. See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Norton, Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and 
Choice Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 485, 490–96 (2015); Solon Barocas & Helen Nissen-
baum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Consent, (Oct. 2009), https://nissenbaum.tech.cor-
nell.edu/papers/ED_SII_On_Notice.pdf.  
 5. Neil M. Richards, Four Privacy Myths, SSRN (Apr. 24, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1589864; see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Jennifer King, Su Li & Joseph Turow, How Dif-
ferent are Young Adults from Older Adults When it Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? 





 6. Richards, supra note 5, at 16–18. 
 7. See infra notes 40–68 and accompanying text.  
 8. Jordan M. Blanke, Criminal Invasion of Privacy: A Survey of Computer Crimes, 41 JURIMETRICS 
443, 456 (2001). 
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Arizona and Florida passed the first “computer crime” statutes in 1978.9 Geor-
gia, Virginia, and West Virginia passed the first criminal invasion of privacy statutes 
in 1999 and 2000.10 The federal government enacted the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act in 198411 and amended it with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA) in 1986.12 We are finally beginning to see more prosecutions under these 
statutes. 
There have been several well-publicized hacking or phishing incidents involv-
ing celebrity photographs in recent years. When two nude selfies of Scarlett Johans-
son were published on the Web in 2011, the most effective and immediate remedy 
was for her to use the “takedown” provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act.13 Because she took the selfies and was the owner thereof, Johannsson could 
have threatened liability under the copyright law for web sites that did not respond 
to her notice by immediately removing the photographs from their web sites.14 Pri-
vacy statutes do not provide similar protection. Johannsson would not have been 
able to use the “takedown” provision of the copyright law had she not been the 
author and owner of the copyright-protected work.15 Obviously, quite often the 
subject of the offending photograph is not the author and is, therefore, unable to 
avail themselves of that provision. 
While Johansson’s use of copyright law resulted in the removal of her photo-
graphs from many more web sites than if she had threatened merely to sue for 
invasion of privacy, it is encouraging to see some computer crime statutes now be-
ing used to prosecute the hackers.16 In the aftermath of this episode, dubbed Op-
eration Hackerazzi by the press, the perpetrator of the breach was prosecuted un-
der two sections of the CFAA, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to the maximum 
ten years in prison.17 The court found that Johansson, and several other celebrities, 
                                                          
 9. Id. at 449. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301(E), 13-2316 (West 2000); FLA. STAT. §§ 815.01–
815.07 (West 1999).   
 10. See Blanke, supra note 8, at 451; GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93(c) (West 1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 
18.2-152.5 (West 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-12 (West 2000). 
 11. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). 
 12. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986).  
 13. See Christopher Satti, A Call to (Cyber) Arms: Applicable Statutes and Suggested Courses of 
Action for the Celebrity iCloud Hacking Scandal, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 561, 579–88 (2016); Jessica E. Easterly, 
Terror in Tinseltown: Who is Accountable When Hollywood Gets Hacked, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 331, 332–37 
(2016); Jordan M. Blanke, Privacy and Outrage, 9 J.L., TECH. & INTERNET 1, 10–11 (2018). 
 14. Under Section 512(g)(1) of Title 17 of the United States Code, “a service provider shall not be 
liable to any person for any claim based on the service providers’ good faith disabling of access to, or re-
moval of, material . . . regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be infring-
ing.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1) (2010). The use of this so-called “DCMA takedown notice” has become extremely 
common. As long as a web host removes the allegedly infringing work, this “safe harbor” provision will pro-
tect it from liability. See Easterly, supra note 13, at 358–59. 
 15. Section 512(b)(2)(E) permits the owner of a copyrighted work to make such a claim. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(b)(2)(E) (2010). 
  16. David Kravets, Scarlett Johansson Hacker Gets 10 Years, WIRED (Dec. 17, 2012, 6:12 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2012/12/scarlett-johansson-hacker/. 
 17. See Satti, supra note 13, at 580–81; see also Easterly, supra note 13, at 348. 
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had suffered both economic loss and severe emotional distress.18 An FBI agent in-
volved in the case likened the defendant’s actions to the “breaking and entering of 
[the celebrities’] private homes by a thief in the night.”19 
Similarly, in what widely became known as The Fappening, and as a result of 
multiple phishing scams, nude photographs of many celebrities were again leaked 
to the Web in 2014.20 One of the celebrities involved was Jennifer Lawrence, whose 
representative threatened that authorities would “prosecute anyone who posts the 
stolen photos.”21 Two men were successfully prosecuted under a section of the 
CFAA prohibiting the unauthorized access of a protected computer.22 One received 
a sentence of eighteen months in prison and the other nine months.23 
Part of the reason for more successful prosecution under computer crime stat-
utes is likely attributable to evolving societal views regarding privacy: “[b]eloved 
figures like Jennifer Lawrence, made vulnerable by having their naked bodies non-
consensually exposed to the world, are . . . sympathetic characters[.]”24 Public out-
rage about some of the more egregious breaches of privacy are starting to shape a 
new sense of what should and should not be permitted in our digital world.25 Other 
examples include the trends towards banning revenge porn26 and upskirt photog-
raphy.27 
9.  INFLUENCE OF CONTEXTUAL INTEGRITY RESEARCH 
In 2004 Helen Nissenbaum wrote the landmark article Privacy as Contextual 
Integrity.28 It has been arguably the most influential article ever written about pri-
vacy in terms of shaping the direction of privacy research and its literature. Many 
of the article’s basic propositions have spawned numerous other articles in a variety 
of disciplines.29 
                                                          
 18. Satti, supra note 13, at 580. 
 19. Id. at 580–81. 
   20. Easterly, supra note 13, at 334.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 349. 
 23. Alan Yuhas, Hacker Who Stole Nude Photos of Celebrities Gets 18 Months in Prison, GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 27, 2016, 7:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/27/nude-celebrity-photos-
hacker-prison-sentence-ryan-collins; ASSOC. PRESS, Chicago Man Gets 9 Months in Celebrity Nude Photo 
Hack, USA TODAY (Jan. 24, 2017, 6:21 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/movies/2017/01/24/chi-
cago-man-gets-9-months-celebrity-nude-photo-hack/97011632/. 
 24. Easterly, supra note 13, at 345. See infra notes 118–37 and accompanying text.  
 25. See Blanke, supra note 13, at 9–17.  
 26. See generally Ari Ezra Waldman, A Breach of Trust: Fighting Nonconsensual Pornography, 
102 IOWA L. REV. 709 (2017); see also 41 States + DC Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER CIV. RTS. INITIATIVE, 
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2019) (Forty-one states and 
Washington, D.C. have now passed revenge porn laws). 
 27. Blanke, supra note 13, at 11–12; Marc Tran, Combatting Gender Privilege and Recognizing a 
Woman’s Right to Privacy in Public Spaces: Arguments to Criminalize Catcalling and Creepshots, 26 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 185 (2016). See generally Jeffrey T. Marvin, Without a Bright-Line on a Green Line: How Com-
monwealth v. Robertson Failed to Criminalize Upskirt Photography, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 119 (2015).  
 28. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004). 
 29. Hundreds of law journal articles have written about contextual integrity. See, e.g., Nizan Ges-
levich Packin and Yafit Lev-Aretz, On Social Credit and the Right to Be Unnetworked, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
339 (2016). A special issue of Ohio State’s I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society was 
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The first part of Nissenbaum’s article presented the three basic principles that 
had dominated discussion of privacy: “(1) limiting surveillance of citizens and use of 
information about them by agents of government, (2) restricting access to sensitive, 
personal, or private information, and (3) curtailing intrusions into places deemed 
private or personal.”30 The second part of her paper described privacy in terms of 
“contextual integrity.”31 
A central tenet of contextual integrity is that there are no arenas of life not 
governed by norms of information flow, no information or spheres of life 
for which “anything goes.” Almost everything—things that we do, events 
that occur, transactions that take place—happens in a context not only of 
place but of politics, convention, and cultural expectation . . . . 
Each of these spheres, realms, or contexts involves, indeed may even be 
defined by, a distinct set of norms, which governs its various aspects such 
as roles, expectations, actions, and practices. For certain contexts, such as 
the highly ritualized settings of many church services, these norms are ex-
plicit and quite specific. For others, the norms may be implicit, variable, 
and incomplete . . . . 
Contexts, or spheres, offer a platform for a normative account of privacy 
in terms of contextual integrity. As mentioned before, contexts are partly 
constituted by norms, which determine and govern key aspects such as 
roles, expectations, behaviors, and limits. There are numerous possible 
sources of contextual norms, including history, culture, law, convention, 
etc. Among the norms present in most contexts are ones that govern in-
formation, and, most relevant to our discussion, information about the 
people involved in the contexts. I posit two types of informational norms: 
norms of appropriateness, and norms of flow or distribution. Contextual 
integrity is maintained when both types of norms are upheld, and it is vio-
lated when either of the norms is violated.32 
Nissenbaum proposed that contextual integrity set up a “presumption in favor 
of the status quo; common practices are understood to reflect norms of appropri-
ateness and flow, and breaches of these norms are held to be violations of pri-
vacy.”33 She discussed how the status quo of norms regarding information flows 
could be challenged for sufficient reason, but that there would need to be a balanc-
ing with relevant social, political, and moral values.34 Among the important privacy 
                                                          
devoted to contextual integrity. VOL. 13 I/S J. L. & POL’Y (2017). Nissenbaum and others wrote an article sur-
veying the computer science literature for applications of contextual integrity. Sebastian Benthall, Seda 
Gürses & Helen Nissenbaum, Contextual Integrity Through the Lens of Computer Science, 2 FOUND. & TRENDS 
PRIVACY & SEC. 1 (2017).  
 30. Nissenbaum, supra note 28, at 125. 
 31. Id. at 136–56. 
 32. Id. at 137–38. 
 33. Id. at 145. 
   34. Id. at 146–47. 
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values presented were prevention of informational harms, informational equality, 
autonomy and freedom, and preservation of important human relationships.35 
An example of an informational harm and a severe breach of contextual integ-
rity was the murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer.36 A disturbed fan was able to 
purchase a database containing Schaeffer’s home address from the Department of 
Motor Vehicles.37 The fan used the address to track her down and kill her.38 Obvi-
ously, the information was not provided to the DMV by Schaeffer with an expecta-
tion that it could be purchased by private individuals. The incident caused a change 
in law prohibiting such sales in the future. 
Nissenbaum’s discussion of informational inequality presaged the prolifera-
tion of articles written about abuses and potential abuses of sophisticated use of 
data analytics.39 Her discussion of autonomy and freedom—or “the right to control 
information about oneself”40—is, obviously, a basic theme in privacy literature and 
in privacy legislation.41 Her discussion of the preservation of important human re-
lationships and the role that trust plays in the ability to limit access to personal in-
formation has also spawned a number of articles on this topic.42 
One of the cases that Nissenbaum used to illustrate the application of contex-
tual integrity involved an example of what has become one of the most difficult and 
offending abuses of information flow—consumer profiling and data mining. She 
stated that “the crucial issue is not whether the information is private or public, 
gathered from private or public settings, but whether the action breaches contex-
tual integrity.”43 This is, if anything, truer and more important today. With the fail-
ure of a notice and consent scheme capable of protecting personal information, 
coupled with the vast amounts of information already out there, the major hope 
today is a regulatory scheme that limits subsequent use of information—and the 
purposes for which the information can be used and the period of time it can be 
retained. All of these speak to the contextual integrity of the information. 
Nissenbaum’s article has been responsible for a generation of literature that 
has built upon her basic propositions and informed the direction of much research 
                                                          
 35. Id. at 147–50. 
 36. Nissenbaum, supra note 28, at 147; see also Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy 
Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 826 (2007). 
   37. Paul Jacobs, Addresses at DMV Remain Accessible, L.A. TIMES, (Aug. 19, 1991), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/1991-08-19/news/mn-608_1_address-information. 
   38. Id. 
 39. See FRANK PASQUALE, BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2015); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s 
Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671 (2016); Janine S. Hiller, Healthy Predictions? Questions for Data Ana-
lytics in Health Care, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 251, 267–81 (2016); Robert Sprague, Welcome to the Machine: Privacy 
and Workplace Implications of Predictive Analysis, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2015); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating 
the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. 
L. REV. 85 (2014); Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014); Omer Tene & 
Jules Polonetsky, Judged by the Tin Man: Individual Rights in the Age of Big Data, 11 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 351 (2013). 
 40. Nissenbaum, supra note 28, at 149. 
 41. A major theme of one of today’s most significant pieces of legislation, the GDPR, is the pro-
tection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons with respect to the collection of their 
personal data. See infra note 186. 
 42. See infra notes 138–53 and accompanying text. 
 43. Nissenbaum, supra note 28, at 152. 
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that is occurring today.44 Much of this literature will shape the direction of privacy 
as it evolves in the near future. 
8. REINTERPRETATION OF THE KATZ TEST 
Ever since 1967 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. United States, 
much of this country’s jurisprudence on privacy law has been the result of the two-
pronged test enunciated in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion: “there is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation 
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as ‘reasonable.’”45 Unfortunately, much of the fifty-year body of law is built 
upon an erroneous interpretation of that test. It is impossible to truly understand 
the Katz case without reading two excellent companion articles by Peter Winn and 
Harvey Schneider.46 Winn’s article, which reads more like a detective story than a 
law journal article—and is befitting the underlying facts of the case, involving a 
bookie living in an apartment on Sunset Boulevard—uncovers the story behind the 
origin of the now-famous Katz test.47 The proposed test was not mentioned in the 
record of the lower courts nor in the briefs filed with the Supreme Court.48 Rather, 
the notion of an objective test based upon the tort law reasonable man standard 
came as an epiphany to a twenty-nine-year-old lawyer during his preparation for 
oral argument before the Supreme Court.49 
Schneider, who was the then twenty-nine-year-old lawyer, wrote that as he 
prepared for oral argument, it dawned upon him that the proper argument and 
questions were not about whether the FBI agents engaged in a trespass or whether 
the phone booth was a constitutionally protected area, but rather “whether a rea-
sonable person . . . could have expected his communication to be private.”50 “The 
test was an objective one, not the subjective test that had been . . .” discussed in the 
briefs. 51  Schneider wrote that during oral argument, he made clear that what he 
was proposing was an objective test.52 He wrote that when Justice White “asked . . 
. a question that seemed to suggest he was focusing on a subjective test,” he 
(Schneider) responded that he was suggesting “an objective test of whether a third 
party, looking at the overall scene, would arrive at that conclusion.”53 Schneider 
wrote about how he explained to the Court how he thought the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test should be applied: 
We propose a test using a way that’s not too dissimilar from the tort “rea-
sonable man” test . . . . [W]e would ask that the test be applied as to 
                                                          
 44. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 45. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 46. Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 40 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2009); Harvey A. Schneider, Katz v. United States: The Untold Story, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
13 (2009). 
 47. Winn, supra note 46. 
 48. Id. at 10. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Schneider, supra note 46, at 19. 
 51. Id. (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 20. 
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whether or not a third person objectively looking at the entire scene could 
reasonably interpret, and could reasonably say, that the communicator in-
tended his communication to be confidential.54 
Winn wrote about how the background and origin of the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test remained largely unknown for over forty years.55 It was not until 
the transcripts of the oral arguments of Supreme Court cases became available 
online that this story came to light.56 Winn wrote that while listening to the oral 
arguments,  
one cannot help but sense the electricity in the air as he [Schneider] pre-
sented the test for the first time to the public. The justices seized on the 
test like children with a new toy, ran through various hypothetical fact sit-
uations, and then tested it against common intuitions of privacy norms.57  
Winn wrote that, during the oral argument, Schneider repeatedly “empha-
sized the objective nature of the test.”58 Nonetheless these exchanges were largely 
ignored and the Katz test took on a life of its own—one that was likely very different 
than the one proposed for it at its conception. 
In a 2015 article, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expec-
tations,59 Orin Kerr made two important points: 1) in the vast majority of cases that 
have applied the Katz test over the years, the vast majority apply only the objective 
test, and 2) Justice Harlan very likely never intended that there be a second-prong, 
a subjective inquiry.60 Regarding the first point, Kerr did an empirical study of the 
540 cases that used the Katz test, and concluded that very few even attempted the 
second part of the test.61 
The results of the study suggest that the subjective prong of Katz is irrele-
vant. A majority of cases applying Katz did not mention subjective expec-
tations. Only 12 percent of Katz cases purported to apply the subjective 
test. Only 2 percent of Katz cases claimed to hinge their analysis on the 
subjective test.62 
Regarding the second point, Kerr argued that Harlan never intended that 
there be a separate subjective test.63 Despite the fact that the test has almost al-
ways been described and applied with two parts, Kerr focused on Harlan’s state-
ment in the concurring opinion that the test was “an understanding of the rule that 
has emerged from prior decisions.”64 Harlan “did not intend to create a new test 
                                                          
 54. Id. 
 55. Winn, supra note 46, at 10. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 113 (2015). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 116–22. 
 62. Id. at 122. 
 63. Id. at 124. 
 64. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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from whole cloth.”65 Rather, Kerr read Harlan’s oft-quoted paragraph enunciating 
the test as three separate sentences: one articulating the test, one explaining the 
subjective test, and one explaining the objective test.66 
[1] My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is 
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expecta-
tion be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." [2] Thus, 
a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but 
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of 
outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to him-
self has been exhibited. [3] On the other hand, conversations in the open 
would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of 
privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.67 
Rather than creating the prongs of a two-part test, and true to Harlan’s asser-
tion that he was not creating a new test, one can read the second sentence as re-
ferring to the then-existing line of cases involving a “voluntary exposure of pro-
tected spaces” and the third sentence as referring to the then-existing “protected-
area cases.”68 This explanation is consistent with the language in the second sen-
tence that states that one loses protection in “objects, activities, or statements that 
he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders.”69 This would explain why Harlan re-
ferred to this line of cases as “subjective” in nature. It would also explain why he 
stated that the “rule . . . has emerged from prior decisions.”70 In this regard, Harlan’s 
subjective test merely restated language from the majority opinion that “[w]hat a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . [b]ut what he seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected.”71 This view is certainly consistent with what Winn and Schneider wrote 
about the purely objective nature of the test proposed in the Katz oral arguments 
before the Supreme Court. It would also add a great bit of sad irony in explaining 
fifty years of misguided judicial interpretation. 
Regardless of what may or may not have been intended by Katz, as Dan Solove 
has written, “the reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to a contentious 
jurisprudence that is riddled with inconsistency.”72 Solove wrote that while the test 
promised the flexibility of being able to evolve with and adapt to emerging technol-
ogies and societal values, it has “failed to live up to aspirations.”73 In the years fol-
lowing Katz, the Supreme Court has “adopted a conception of privacy that countless 
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commentators have found to be overly narrow, incoherent, short-sighted, deleteri-
ous to liberty, and totally out of touch with society.”74 “As Justice Scalia once stated, 
‘In my view, the only thing the past three decades have established about the Katz 
test . . . is that, unsurprisingly, [reasonable expectations of privacy] bear an uncanny 
resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasona-
ble.’”75 
Another problem with the reasonable expectation of privacy standard is the 
inevitability of shrinking expectations. As Shaun Spencer predicted in 2002, every 
time there is an encroachment of privacy, society’s expectations are diminished.76 
So, for example, if employers monitor their employees' telephone or e-
mail use while they are in the workplace, they diminish the expectation of 
privacy in the workplace. If merchants routinely sell consumers' personal 
data, they diminish the expectation of privacy in one's transactional infor-
mation. And if the Supreme Court holds that law enforcement may review 
citizens' bank records without a warrant, it diminishes the societal expec-
tation of privacy in one's bank records.77 
These encroachments occur gradually and just “seem to be the inevitable 
price of progress.”78 Spencer predicted that from time to time, industry or govern-
ment might go too far with its intrusions into “settled societal expectations” and 
that an adjustment or retreat would be necessary.79 
If the Supreme Court were ever to revisit the Katz test and redefine it as the 
one-prong, subjective test that it was proposed and intended to be, it could dra-
matically change the much-distorted notion of a “reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.” As I do not believe that this re-interpretation is very likely to happen, I will 
keep this item fairly low on my list.80 
7. PRIVATE ADOPTION OF FEDERAL STANDARDS 
Given the absence of omnibus legislation that dictates specifics regarding pro-
tection of personal information, there has been a growing trend in private industry 
to adopt some of the best practices of the federal government. The National Insti-
tute for Standards and Technology (NIST), a federal agency, has been very active in 
producing stringent standards for federal agencies regarding security and privacy.81 
                                                          
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1521 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 76. Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L.R. 843 
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 79. Id. at 866. 
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 81. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., https://www.nist.gov/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2019). 
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Its Cybersecurity Framework82 was created to “provide a prioritized, flexible, re-
peatable, performance-based, and cost-effective approach, including information 
security measures and controls, to help owners and operators of critical infrastruc-
ture identify, assess, and manage cyber risk.”83 It has been so successful that many 
private organizations, while not required to do so, have adopted it. 
A recent Gartner study reported that NIST's Cybersecurity Framework is 
already used by 30% of U.S organizations. This number is expected to rise 
to 50% by 2020. According to a March 2016 survey by Dimensional Re-
search, 70% of these organizations adopted the framework to align them-
selves with cybersecurity best practices, 29% were required to do so by 
business partners, and 28% adopted the framework because of federal 
contract requirements.84 
Lee Kim, Director of Privacy and Security at the Healthcare Information Man-
agement Systems Society (HIMSS) urged healthcare organizations to adopt NIST’s 
Cybersecurity Framework: “it is voluntary and can be applied to virtually all organi-
zations.”85 “The Framework not only provides technical guidance on how to build a 
comprehensive security program, but it also provides suggested methodology for 
communicating among internal and external stakeholders about cybersecurity 
risk.”86 “The NIST Cybersecurity Framework provides guidance on how executives 
and non-executives can communicate about cybersecurity risk both inside and out-
side of the organization.”87 
Similarly, in a document called “Why you should adopt the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework,” PwC urged its clients to adopt the standard: 
It is our opinion that the NIST Cybersecurity Framework represents a tip-
ping point in the evolution of cybersecurity, one in which the balance is 
shifting from reactive compliance to proactive risk-management stand-
ards. While the Framework is voluntary, organizations across industries 
may gain significant benefits by adopting the guidelines at the highest pos-
sible risk-tolerance level given investment capital.88 
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In January 2017 Congressman Ralph Abraham introduced a bill that would 
strengthen the reach of the Cybersecurity Framework.89 Among other things, it 
would establish a federal working group and a public-private working group “to help 
the public and private sector use the framework more effectively.”90 
As more structured approaches to security and privacy emerge—and they will 
likely come from governmental bodies, either here or in the European Union—pri-
vate organizations will be more inclined to adopt them. As private organizations 
realize that they are facing more liability for breaches in security or privacy, they 
will likely move towards whatever established standards exist in order to be able to 
claim adherence to best practices. We are starting to see this happen, and I believe 
it will continue to become more and more common. 
6. MERGER OF SECURITY AND PRIVACY INTERESTS IN SYSTEM DESIGN 
At least since 9/11, privacy and national security often have been viewed as 
competing interests. Security can only be achieved at the cost of privacy, and pri-
vacy can only be achieved at the cost of security. Security experts often view privacy 
as a subpart of security, and privacy experts often view security as a subpart of pri-
vacy. Fortunately, there is a growing recognition that, rather than being competing 
interests, they are actually complimentary interests, and are often intricately inter-
twined. 
Given the success of NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework, it is not surprising that 
NIST followed up with a Privacy Framework.91 One of NIST’s goals was to “enable 
the creation of new systems that mitigate the risk of privacy harm and address pri-
vacy risks in a measurable way within an organization’s overall risk management 
process.”92 The Privacy Framework is built upon three objectives, predictability, 
manageability, and disassociability “for the purpose of facilitating the development 
and operation of privacy-preserving information systems.”93 The general approach 
in designing the Privacy Framework was the same as for the Cybersecurity Frame-
work: to have objectives that would “provide a degree of precision and measurabil-
ity, so that system designers and engineers, working with policy teams, can use 
them to bridge the gap between high-level principles and implementation.”94 
The Privacy Framework acknowledges that while security and privacy are 
clearly different, they are often intertwined: “[p]ublic discourse on the relationship 
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between security and privacy often includes colloquial phrases such as ‘security and 
privacy are two sides of a coin’ and ‘there is no privacy without security.’”95 “Rec-
ognizing the boundaries and overlap between privacy and security is key to deter-
mining when existing security risk models and security-focused guidance may be 
applied to address privacy concerns—and where there are gaps that need to be 
filled in order to achieve an engineering approach to privacy.”96 
The privacy principles in the Privacy Framework are built largely upon the re-
quirements enunciated in the Office of Management and Budget’s Circular A-130,97 
which were built largely upon the Fair Information Practice Principles first enunci-
ated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973.98 By presenting 
these principles as much as possible as system privacy requirements, NIST attempts 
to facilitate a privacy-by-design, engineering approach to building systems that will 
be trustworthy and will protect personal information.99 
The Privacy Framework represents the most ambitious attempt to covert fuzzy 
privacy principles into quantifiable and measurable system requirements. Inasmuch 
as this approach has been very successful regarding Cybersecurity, there is good 
reason to believe it will have similar success as this approach evolves and becomes 
more widely accepted in both the public and the private realm. 
5. NARROWING OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 
Two Supreme Court cases from the 1970s significantly directed the evolution 
of privacy law as it pertained to personal information. In United States v. Miller, the 
Supreme Court held that an individual does not have an expectation of privacy in 
financial records once he or she has shared them with a bank.100  Three years later, 
in Smith v. Maryland, the Court held that there was no expectation of privacy in a 
list of phone numbers that a person has dialed once that list has been shared with 
the phone company. 101 This so-called “third-party doctrine” evolved way beyond 
what those justices could have possibly envisioned at the dawn of the digital age. It 
has proven to be a major obstacle to the protection of personal information. Basi-
cally, the doctrine has been interpreted to mean that as soon as someone transmits 
data to any third party, he or she has waived any right to limit its distribution or use. 
This is, way more often than not, an absurd result, and the doctrine has been right-
fully criticized.102 
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In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the 
third-party doctrine in a 5-4 decision written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan.103 The Court refused to extend the 
doctrine to cell-site location information (CSLI) that is generated automatically and 
continuously whenever an individual’s phone is turned on.104 The Court held that 
“an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his 
physical movements as captured through CSLI.”105 It recognized that there is a 
“world of difference between the limited types of personal information addressed 
in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of information casually collected 
by wireless carriers today.”106 The Court held that this chronicle of information “im-
plicates privacy concerns far beyond those considered in Smith and Miller,” and re-
fused to extend the doctrine to CSLI.107 The Court did not, however, provide a 
bright-line test for future cases.108 
Four separate dissenting opinions presented a variety of objections, some of 
which were focused on traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but some of 
which, arguably, provided some hope for the future of data protection.109 Justice 
Thomas questioned the defendant’s interest and ability to object to a search of the 
CSLI maintained by the cell phone company, but stated that the “more fundamental 
problem with the Court’s opinion, however, is its use of the ‘reasonable expectation 
of privacy’ test.”110 He believed that the Court needs to reconsider the Katz test.111 
Justice Alito began his dissent: “I share the Court’s concern about the effect 
of new technology on personal privacy, but I fear that today’s decision will do far 
more harm than good.”112 His dissent focused on two objections: first, that “the 
Court ignor[ed] the basic distinction between an actual search . . . and an order 
merely requiring a party to look through its own records and produce specified doc-
uments,”113 and second, that “the Court allows a defendant to object to the search 
of a third party’s property.”114 His decision in Carpenter was much anticipated be-
cause of his concurring opinion in Jones v. U.S. (which was joined by Justices Gins-
burg, Breyer and Kagan), regarding the use of a GPS tracking device.115 In Jones, 
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Justice Alito was very concerned about how new technology could affect expecta-
tions of privacy:  
[T]he Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable 
person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But 
technology can change those expectations. Dramatic technological change 
may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may ul-
timately provide significant changes in popular attitudes.116  
He suggested that in “circumstances involving dramatic technological change, 
the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”117 
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent provides several instances of optimism for the future 
of data privacy protection. First, he appeared ready to abandon the third-party doc-
trine entirely, agreeing with criticisms like the “third-party-doctrine is not only 
wrong, but horribly wrong,”118 recognizing that people “often do reasonably expect 
that information they entrust to third parties, especially information subject to con-
fidentiality agreements, will be kept private,”119 and stating that the Court has 
never provided a persuasive justification for the doctrine.120 
Second, Justice Gorsuch criticized the “often unpredictable—and sometimes 
unbelievable—jurisprudence”121 that has come from the Katz test and warned 
about extending it to “data privacy cases.”122 In criticizing the Court’s lack of direc-
tion on how to apply what’s left of the third-party doctrine, he stated that “[a]ll we 
know is that historical cell-site location information . . . escapes Smith and Miller’s 
shorn grasp, while a lifetime of bank or phone records does not.”123 “In the Court’s 
defense, though, we have arrived at this strange place not because the Court has 
misunderstood Katz. Far from it. We have arrived here because this is where Katz 
inevitably leads.”124 
Finally, Justice Gorsuch suggested another way of approaching the facts of the 
case. First, just because a third party “has access to or possession of your papers 
and effects does not necessarily eliminate your interest in them”125 and “[j]ust be-
cause you entrust your data—in some cases, your modern day papers and effects—
to a third party may not mean you lose any Fourth Amendment protection in its 
contents.”126 Second, he stated that he doubted whether “complete ownership or 
exclusive control of property is always necessary to the assertion of a Fourth 
Amendment right.”127 “At least some of this Court’s decisions have already sug-
gested that use of technology is functionally compelled by the demands of modern 
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life.”128 Third, Justice Gorsuch concluded by also calling for legislation: “positive law 
may help provide detailed guidance on evolving technologies without resort to ju-
dicial intuition. State (or sometimes federal) law often creates rights in both tangi-
ble and intangible things.”129 “If state legislators or state courts say that a digital 
record has the attributes that normally make something property, that may supply 
a sounder basis for judicial decision-making than judicial guesswork about societal 
expectations.”130 
While Carpenter did not overturn the third-party doctrine as it applies to data, 
it did provide a majority of justices who recognized that there have been “seismic 
shifts in digital technology”131 since the doctrine arose in the 1970s and refused to 
extend it to CSLI. Furthermore, there are several justices who would like to see leg-
islation that addresses privacy data protection and who would like to see the Katz 
test revisited. 
4. SOCIAL NORMS CONTINUE TO EVOLVE 
This is the item that is the most difficult to quantify, yet is most related to and 
most intertwined with many of the other items in this list.132 Ultimately, it is the 
most important factor because the strength and prevalence of privacy values and 
social norms will determine the extent and scope of data privacy protection. 
Ever since Scott McNealy’s and Mark Zuckerberg’s proclamations that privacy 
is dead,133 there has been much discussion about whether people even care about 
privacy anymore, and if so, just how much. A number of studies seem to suggest 
that, while people say they care about their privacy, they often are unwilling to do 
anything to protect it.134 
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More recent information seems to support Neil Richards’ positions that 1) pri-
vacy is not dead, and 2) young people do care about privacy.135 An Australian study 
about privacy in the digital world found that 40 percent of respondents disagreed 
with the statement, “[t]here is no privacy, get over it.”136 People over 70 years old 
were the group most likely to agree with that statement.137 More than half of the 
respondents disagreed with the statement, “[c]oncerns about privacy online are ex-
aggerated.”138 Interestingly, about a third of them were undecided, perhaps sug-
gesting some confusion about the issue. When asked whether they felt that they 
could control their privacy online, almost half of 18 to 29 year-olds said they could; 
only 34 percent of those over 40 thought that they could.139 This is certainly con-
sistent with the view that, while younger people have grown up with a different 
privacy environment, they are concerned about and take steps to protect their pri-
vacy. 
In the aftermath of the Facebook debacle involving the use of personal data 
Cambridge Analytica, the Pew Research Center found that there is “a renewed focus 
on how social media companies collect personal information and make it available 
to marketers.”140 As will be discussed in more detail below, California recently 
passed a very extensive privacy law, under threat of an even stricter proposal 
planned as a ballot initiative.141 The “ballot measure had been polling at around 80 
percent approval.”142 The California Assembly approved the measure 69-0 and the 
Senate approved it 36-0.143 “It was a remarkable sea change from last year when 
one of the authors of the new bill . . . tried to pass a bill that [was much less rigor-
ous]. That bill didn’t make it out of committee.”144 There appears to be much more 
concern for data protection than there has been in quite some time. 
In his classic book Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Lawrence Lessig wrote 
that four constraints regulate behavior in cyberspace: the law, social norms, the 
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market, and architecture (or code).145 In describing how social norms can easily be 
downplayed when it comes to defining the regulation of privacy, danah boyd and 
Alice Marwick stated that “social norms are inherently unstable and constantly 
evolving; they vary widely and are difficult to pin down.”146 They wrote, “[w]hen it 
comes to privacy, social norms are evolving, but not disappearing.”147 
Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky questioned the “role of regulation in the ab-
sence of stable social norms”148 when society attempts to address rapid and drastic 
changes in technology. “Should restrictions on conduct be based on law or on softer 
social norms? Should regulation drive or be driven by volatile individual expecta-
tions, market best practices, and social norms? Should we wait for norms to develop 
to form societal expectations?”149 They observed that in the past, “privacy values 
and norms took years or even centuries to develop,”150 but that as “technological 
innovation accelerates, so does the need to recalibrate individual expectations, so-
cial norms, and, ultimately, laws and regulations.”151 They stated that “[t]hree main 
vectors of influence drive the changes that affect individuals’ perceptions of privacy 
and social norms:” businesses, technologies, and individuals.152 
We have seen ever-increasing acceleration from each of these forces since 
they wrote their article in 2013. Businesses “are constantly pushing more users to 
engage more often and share more data, sometimes pushing against social norms 
and challenging traditional values.”153 Technology continues to push the envelope 
with smaller, faster, more powerful, and more invasive devices. And individuals con-
tinue to share more and more information as they are tempted by—and generally 
satisfied by—all the new and shiny bells and whistles. 
Social norms develop over time. Generally, they are molded by advancements 
and improvements in technology, along with individuals’ willingness to participate 
in new flows of information. Sometimes, however, adjustments are made. Often, 
they are a result of outrage.154 When something like Cambridge Analytica happens, 
the public pays more attention to the issues directing those evolving norms. I be-
lieve that we are at a time now where those norms are particularly in flux. 
3. RECOGNITION OF TRUST AS IMPORTANT PRIVACY FACTOR 
In recent years there has been a good bit of research indicating just how im-
portant trust is today regarding privacy and the digital world. Neil Richards and 
Woodrow Hartzog stated that trust is an “essential ingredient for our digital 
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lives.”155 “Without trust, people share less information, bad information, or no in-
formation at all. They become anxious, bewildered, and suspicious . . . . If people 
don’t trust a company, they are more likely to switch to a competitor or resist or 
fail to become fully invested in the commercial relationship.”156 They argued that 
“modern privacy law is incomplete because from its inception it has failed to ac-
count for the importance of trust.”157 “One of the bedrock notions of privacy law is 
that companies should be transparent about their data collection, use, and disclo-
sure practices so that individuals will be on notice of any potentially worrisome 
practices and can tailor their disclosures accordingly.”158 “Trust need not be exclu-
sively a matter of government policy. Companies can also voluntarily adopt trust-
enhancing internal policies, safeguards, and organizational schemes . . . . Companies 
can delete data when it is no longer needed and collect no more information than 
is necessary for the information relationship.”159 
Richards and Hartzog summarized how trust can best be promoted in the con-
text of personal information by describing four characteristics or values that must 
exist within our data stewards: 
First, trustworthy stewards are honest because they explain to us the 
terms under which they hold and use our data. . . . 
Second, they are discreet because they treat our data as presumptively 
confidential and do not disclose it in ways contrary to our interests or ex-
pectations. 
Third, trustworthy stewards are protective because they hold the data se-
curely against third parties, doing everything within reason to protect us 
from hacks and data breaches. 
Fourth, and most fundamentally, those we trust are loyal because they put 
our interests ahead of their own short-term potential for gain.160 
Ari Ezra Waldman has written extensively about privacy as trust.161 He wrote 
that “privacy, particularly in the information-sharing context, is really a social con-
struct based on trust between social sharers, between individuals and Internet in-
termediaries, between groups of people interacting online and offline. . . .”162 He 
believes that trust underlies our most basic notions of privacy. He wrote that at the 
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core of society’s relatively quick response to ban “revenge porn” was the recogni-
tion that this represented a flagrant and egregious breach of trust.163 “Trust is a 
resource of social capital between or among two or more persons concerning the 
expectations that other members of their community will behave according to ac-
cepted norms. It is . . . the belief that others will behave in a predictable manner.”164 
This is yet another example of how it often takes an incident, or a series of incidents, 
to illicit public outrage that prompts a legislative or regulatory response.165 
Waldman also wrote about how important trust is to our ever-growing social 
networks, most notably, Facebook. He described how Facebook’s model is built al-
most entirely on trust and about how extensively Facebook manipulates and abuses 
that trust. He wrote that Facebook’s platform 
not only creates the circumstances for social interaction with those we 
trust, it exploits the trust we have in our friends and families for financial 
gain by manipulating us into sharing information with third party advertis-
ers . . . [and that] Facebook’s design strategy to leverage trust to manipu-
late us into clicking on those advertisements should give us pause. Regula-
tors should step in.166 
Facebook keeps trying to push the envelope. It has certainly had opportunities 
to cultivate, rather than destroy, public trust—or at least, the perception of trust. It 
recovered from a good bit of bad publicity in 2014 regarding its unauthorized ex-
perimental with A/B testing.167 It is now mired in possibly its biggest challenge—to 
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justify the use of data by Cambridge Analytica to apparently manipulate a presiden-
tial election.168 Mark Zuckerberg publicly acknowledged that this was a “major 
breach of trust.”169 
Facebook seems willing to try to get away with as much as it possibly can. In 
2016 it vehemently denied using geolocation data to suggest new friends in one’s 
news feed.170 Anecdotally, I recently visited some softball fields on which I played 
for many years. Many of my current Facebook friends are former softball buddies. 
The day after my visit, at least seven of the first ten suggested friends that popped 
up on my Facebook feed were guys with whom I had just spoken in person the day 
before. Most of these were people I had not seen in many months and, I don’t be-
lieve, had ever appeared in my suggested friends list before. 
The growing body of literature about trust suggests that there is finally a basic 
understanding that this is an important aspect of our digital lives. Companies will 
no longer be able to claim a blind eye with regard to this important factor—and 
those that do will likely suffer in the marketplace. 
2. PRIVACY AS BUSINESS STRATEGY 
In a Harvard Business Review article, Privacy is a Business Opportunity, David 
Hoffman wrote a few years ago that “privacy protection should be a practice as 
fundamental to the business as customer service. Privacy is an essential element of 
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being a good business partner.”171 He stated that many corporate boardrooms are 
now discussing “what should be done to integrate privacy as an added value to the 
business.”172 He stated that it had been estimated “that brand value represents 
nearly one-third of the $12 trillion in market capitalization of the S&P 500.”173 
“When an incident related to privacy occurs, it is a direct blow to the brand’s esteem 
and its financial value.”174 This has certainly been the case recently with Facebook 
losing an estimated $50-60 billion in value in a matter of days as a result of the 
Cambridge Analytica episode.175 
Hoffman wrote that the “shift to a fundamentally digital economy means that, 
regardless of the sector you are in, your ability to protect individuals will distinguish 
your company from competitors who have taken a passive approach or who ignore 
their responsibilities.”176 He predicted that in the near-future, “some healthcare 
provider will surely earn a reputation among consumers and within the industry as 
the company that takes the greatest care to protect their patients’ information.”177 
He predicted similar results in other sectors. 
In a recent white paper entitled Revitalizing Privacy and Trust in a Data-Driven 
World, PwC summarized some if its findings from The Global State of Information 
Security Survey 2018.178 Among its nine insights on data privacy and trust were: 
“The challenge for CEOs is going beyond awareness to action,” “[b]eyond confiden-
tiality, privacy expectations focus on data use,” and “[c]onsumers will vote for re-
sponsible innovation and data use with their wallets.”179 
Regarding the first item, PwC reported that “[t]here is some cause for opti-
mism . . . 87% of global CEOs say they are investing in cybersecurity to build trust 
with customers. Nearly as many (81%) say they are creating transparency in the 
usage and storage of data.”180 Regarding the second item, PwC stated that “data 
privacy is becoming more about controlling how data is used.”181 It noted that NIST 
included the goal of “disassociability” in its recent Privacy Framework and that the 
EU’s GDPR emphasized both privacy by design and data minimization.182 
Regarding the third item, PwC contended that “[c]onsumers do put a mone-
tary value on privacy—but context matters. It may seem paradoxical when consum-
ers voice privacy concerns while still providing personal data online, but this does 
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not mean consumers do not value privacy.”183 It discussed the work of Alessandro 
Acquisti, whose “research suggests that privacy preferences are shaped by context 
as opposed to being absolute.”184 The report stated that “consumers will pay more 
for technology products that are designed with security and privacy in mind.” In its 
summary, among the things that PwC urged leaders to do were “prioritize data-use 
governance” and “view GDPR as an opportunity . . . to align their organizations to 
where they need to be for future success, not merely for compliance but rather for 
strategic risk management.”185 
This recognition by corporate leadership that privacy is important and can be 
used for strategic advantage is long overdue. As more businesses recognize the dan-
gers of ignoring its consumers concerns about their data, we will see a major growth 
in an attempt to “sell privacy.” More companies will invest in best practices to pro-
tect data and to inform their customers exactly what and why they are doing. As 
the PwC report noted, with the GDPR having recently come into effect, there has 
never been a better time for companies to become serious about protecting data. 
1. PEER PRESSURE—THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CALIFORNIA 
A. The European Union 
The much-anticipated General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the Eu-
ropean Union became effective on May 25, 2018,186 basically replacing the Data 
Directive of 1995.187 It is the most aggressive attempt anywhere to provide for the 
protection of personal data. It contains many significant changes that appear likely 
to have, in many cases, worldwide effect. 
Any company that wants to continue doing business globally—and that in-
cludes doing business in the EU or having customers, suppliers, or other contacts 
who reside in the EU—will have to make changes to its past practices. The scope of 
the GDPR includes the processing of the personal data of any EU resident, regard-
less of where that data may actually be stored and processed.188 Any company that 
does business with or in the EU will have to pay attention to the new regulations. 
Companies will have to decide if it is worth maintaining different policies and 
practices for EU residents and for non-EU residents. I do not think it will be. For 
most large companies, it will be easier just to adopt GDPR-friendly practices across 
the board. Obviously, this would be a major bonus for residents of the United 
States—and elsewhere—when it comes to protecting personal data. 
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At the heart of the GDPR is its Article 5: Principles relating to processing of 
personal data: 
1. Personal data shall be: 
(a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the 
data subject (‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’); 
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes; . . . (‘pur-
pose limitation’); 
(c) adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the 
purposes for which they are processed (‘data minimisation’); 
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; . . . (‘accuracy’); 
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no 
longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data are 
processed; . . . (‘storage limitation’); 
(f) processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal 
data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and 
against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical 
or organisational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’).189 
These principles are based upon, and are the most rigorous manifestation of, 
the principles first enunciated in the FIPPs (1973),190 then in the OECD Guidelines 
(1980),191 the EU Data Protection Directive (1995),192 and most recently, for federal 
agencies, the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130 (2016).193 Some of 
the trickle-down effects of the GDPR will likely provide the greatest amount of data 
protection that U.S. residents have ever had. 
A major change under the GDPR is a return to one of the cornerstone princi-
ples of the FIPPS—a true and legitimate consent.194 Consent must be a “freely given, 
specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes . . . by a 
statement or by clear affirmative action signif[ying] agreement to the processing of 
personal data.”195 If consent is obtained by a written document that also concerns 
any other matter, the “request for consent shall be presented in a manner which is 
clearly distinguishable from other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible 
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form, using plain and clear language.”196 This means that the request for consent 
can no longer be in fine print or legalese, and there can no longer be pre-checked 
boxes or opt-in consent. Furthermore, consent can be withdrawn at any time.197 
Once there is consent, and according to the principles of Article 5, the data 
shall be “processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner,”198 “collected for 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner 
that is incompatible manner,”199 “adequate, relevant and limited to what is neces-
sary” for the specified purposes,200 “accurate and . . . kept up to date,”201 and “kept 
in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than neces-
sary.”202 This marks a sea change in how data would be processed in the United 
States. 
Additionally, without specific consent, the processing “of personal data re-
vealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or 
trade union membership, and the processing of generic data, biometric data for the 
purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data 
concerning a natural person’s sex life or orientation shall be prohibited.”203 Mem-
ber states would be able to further restrict or limit the processing of “genetic data, 
biometric data or data concerning health.”204 
Individuals will have the right to access their personal data held by control-
lers,205 will have the right to have inaccurate information corrected,206 will have the 
right to have personal data erased “without undue delay”207 if the data is “no longer 
necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected. . . or pro-
cessed,”208 or if the individual withdraws consent,209 or if the data “ha[s] been un-
lawfully processed.”210 
Furthermore, an individual may object to the processing of data used for pur-
poses of direct marketing and the practice of profiling to the extent that it is used 
for direct marketing.211 When an individual objects to the use of personal data for 
direct marketing purposes, “the personal data shall no longer be processed for such 
purposes.”212 The individual also has “the right not to be subject to a decision based 
solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects 
concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”213 
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The GDPR will apply to the processing of personal data of residents of the EU 
“regardless of whether the processing takes place in the [EU] or not.”214 In order to 
continue to do business with, and maintain personal data on EU residents, compa-
nies around the world will have to make drastic changes to their current policies 
and practices. 
While many U.S. companies have already made changes to their privacy poli-
cies,215 it remains to be seen just how much of the GDPR they actually adopt. There 
are many far-reaching requirements of GDPR that appear highly unlikely to be fol-
lowed by U.S. companies. While some basic provisions will probably be modeled, it 
will be surprising if many companies adopt all of the GDPR. For example, in a state-
ment made recently before Congress, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg appeared to say 
that Facebook would abide by the new law216 but later seemed to backtrack from 
that statement.217 
Even if companies were to adopt the basic principles relating to the processing 
of data, as described above—which would be in and of itself an enormous change 
for most companies—it would be hard to imagine adoption of some of the more 
far-reaching requirements related to access, correction, erasure, and retention of 
data. Furthermore, it is unlikely that some of the restrictions on the use of data for 
direct marketing and profiling purposes would be widely adopted voluntarily. 
B. California 
Shortly after the GDPR became effective, California adopted a rigorous new 
law that incorporates many of the same basic principles: The California Consumer 
Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA) becomes effective on January 1, 2020.218 The bill was 
passed unanimously by the California legislature under threat of a stricter law that 
was being planned for submission as a ballot initiative that “had been polling at 
around 80 percent approval.”219 High tech companies “Google, Facebook, Verizon, 
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Comcast and AT&T each contributed $200,000 to a committee opposing the pro-
posed ballot measure, and lobbyists had estimated that businesses would spend 
$100 million to campaign against it before the November election.”220 There is still 
concern that those same groups will use the time before the law becomes effective 
to “water it down.”221 
The CCPA will give Californians far greater protection for their personal infor-
mation than anywhere else in the United States. Californians will have “the right to 
request that a business that collects . . . personal information disclose . . . the cate-
gories and specific pieces of personal information the business has collected.”222  
A business that collects . . . personal information, shall, at or before the 
point of collection, inform . . . as to the categories of personal information 
to be collected and the purposes for which the categories of personal in-
formation shall be used. A business shall not collect additional categories 
of personal information or use personal information collected for addi-
tional purposes without providing . . . notice.223 
“Personal information” is defined as “information that identifies, relates to, 
describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, di-
rectly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”224 It includes, but is 
not limited to a “real name, alias, postal address, unique personal identifier, online 
identifier Internet Protocol address, email address, account name, social security 
number, driver’s license number, passport, or similar identifiers.”225 
Californians will have the right to request a business to delete personal infor-
mation that has been collected about them.226 They will be able to request that a 
business disclose to them the categories of personal information it has collected, 
the categories of sources from which the personal information is collected, the busi-
ness or commercial purposes for collecting or selling the personal information, the 
categories of third parties with whom the business shares the personal information, 
and the specific pieces of personal information it has collected.227 They will be able 
to make similar requests about personal information that was sold to third parties 
by the business.228 
Californians will have the right to opt out from the sale of their personal infor-
mation to third parties.229 Additional restrictions may apply when individuals are 
less than 16 years of age.230 Businesses will not be able to discriminate against those 
making requests under the law by denying goods or services, or charging different 
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prices, or providing a different level or quality of goods or services,231 unless the 
”difference is reasonably related to the value provided to the consumer by the con-
sumer’s data.”232 Businesses will be able to “offer financial incentives, including 
payments to consumers as compensation, for collection of personal information, 
the sale of personal information, or the deletion of personal information.”233 A busi-
ness will only be able to enter a consumer into a financial incentive program with 
prior opt-in consent234 and cannot use a program that is “unjust, unreasonable, co-
ercive, or usurious in nature.”235 
The law will require businesses to “[m]ake available to consumers two or more 
designated methods for submitting requests for information required to be dis-
closed . . . including, at a minimum, a toll-free telephone number, and if the business 
maintains an Internet Web site, a Web site address.”236 It will require that certain 
information about the law be included in a business’s online privacy policy.237 The 
law will also require that a business which sells personal information “[p]rovide a 
clear and conspicuous link on the business’ Internet homepage, titled ‘Do Not Sell 
My Personal Information,’ to an Internet Web page that enables a consumer, or a 
person authorized by the consumer, to opt out of the sale of the consumer’s per-
sonal information.”238 A business will not be able to “require a consumer to create 
an account in order to direct the business not to sell the consumer’s personal infor-
mation.”239 
It will be interesting to see if special interest groups will be able to water down 
the requirements of the law as it now stands. California has certainly raised the bar 
for data protection in the United States. It will also be interesting to see how many 
other states use this law as a model for legislation. 
II. CONCLUSION 
The last several items on this list, particularly the evolution of societal privacy 
norms and values, the recognition of the importance of trust as a privacy factor, the 
realization that privacy can be used as a successful business strategy, and the EU 
and California legislation, have provided a climate that is probably as conducive for 
change in privacy laws as it has been since prior to 9/11. Hopefully there is enough 
energy from these factors to push the evolution of data privacy protection in a new 
direction. Only time will tell. 
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